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Serial Investors and Early Stage Finance
Peter Kelly
Michael Hay

This study examines the early stage investment activity of UK serial investors, individ
uals who have made at least three private investments. Two distinct groups emerged;
one which invested on their own all the time (“solo serial investors”) and the other
which invested with others almost exclusively (“syndicate serial investors”). Both
groups had invested in a variety of industrial sectors, a majority of which were in sec
tors where no one in the investor group had previous direct experience. Concept famil
iarity appeared to be a necessary, albeit insuf^cient, prerequisite to the decision to
invest. For a majority of the investments reviewed for both groups, the investor(s)
backed individuals personally known to them, to another syndicate member, and/or to
the deal referrer. AVhen the linkage to performance is explored, both solo and syndicate
serial investors are well advised to back entrepreneurs known to a least one member of
the investor group.

I. INTRODUCTION
If one were asked to describe a “typical” private investor, research conducted in
the US (Wetzel 1981; Gaston & Bell 1988), Canada (Short & Riding 1989), UK
(Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991) and Sweden (Landstrom 1993) would charac
terise the individual as:
•
•
•
•
•
•

a middle-aged male; with
reasonable net income and personal net worth; and
previous start-up experience; who
makes one investment a year, usually close to home; and
prefers to invest in high technology and manufacturing ventures; with
an expectation to sell out in three to five years time.
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While it is appealing to conclude that private investors as a group across a
number of countries share similar traits, the evidence collected to date supports the
notion that the informal venture capital market is rather heterogeneous in character
(Freear & Wetzel 1992). There is a growing awareness among researchers in the
informal venture capital area of the need to disaggregate the unit of analysis fur
ther. A number of authors have developed typologies^ to identify distinct sub
groups within the population classifying individuals based on a number of differ
ent criteria including: investment motivation, background experience, operating
style and the number of investments made.
In an effort to address this research need, in this study we have restricted our
attention to the most active market segment, namely informal investors which have
made more than three investments in privately-owned firms. There is a growing
body of evidence to suggest that a significant minority of private investors have yet
to make their first investment (so called “virgin angels”) or invest rather infre
quently, while a smaller yet substantial group of investors are very active, often
large scale, investors (Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991; Stevenson & Coveney
1994; Landstrom 1993). We refer to this latter group as “serial investors.” The
decision to concentrate exclusively on serial investors is motivated by several fac
tors: i) in all likelihood, these investors account for a disproportionately large per
centage of actual investment activity; ii) it is reasonable to suggest that experience
effects may be operating—^in this respect, we may have the most to learn from
serial investors; and iii) understanding the active segment of the market may serve
to stimulate additional investment activity from relatively inactive investors.
Generally speaking, private investors are remarkably entrepreneurial individ
uals in their own right, a majority have started a business of their own or have pre
vious management experience in the new venture setting (Wetzel 1981; Sullivan
1992; Neiswander 1985; Short & Riding 1989; Riding 1993; Landstrom 1993;
Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991; Stevenson & Coveney 1994). It seems reason
able to suggest that private investors face a challenge in making the transition from
“entrepreneur” to “investor” and that based on the level of investment activity
reported, serial investors seem to make this transition much easier than less active
informal investors. In fact, all of the respondents in our study have previous direct
experience in the new venture setting.
This paper is motivated by the underlying question: is there anything to be
learned from the experience of this very active, entrepreneurial group of investors
for ventures in their early stages of development seeking equity finance? Clearly,
the answer to this question would be useful both for entrepreneurs seeking capital
and for private investors alike. For entrepreneurs, this study begins to address the
important question: which investor(s) should I approach? For investors, financing
early stage ventures implies the assumption of a great deal of risk. Does it make
sense to invest as part of a syndicate to achieve some measure of diversification?
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In view of the inherently higher risks involved, should serial investors restrict their
investment activity to opportunities where at least one investor has previous
knowledge of the industry in which the venture competes and/or the people
involved?
II.

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

An investor bears risk any time an investment is made. Inherently, investment
returns are impacted by external developments in the firm’s competitive domain;
what has been referred to in the finance literature as business or market risk. In
addition, there is the ever present possibility that entrepreneurs will not always act
with the best interests of the investor in mind, commonly referred to as agency risk.
In a theoretical world of perfect information, neither of these risks would exist—
investors would be able to select investments that offer the most profitable and
durable profit stream directed by an entrepreneur that is fully aware of, and acts in
complete accordance with, the interest(s) of the investor. In the practical world,
investors seek out ways to manage business and agency risk. For purposes of clar
ity, it is useful to separate out the discussion of how to manage risks inherent to the
opportunity (business risk) from those embodied in the individual(s) who wish to
exploit it (agency risk).
Managing Business Risk
Conventional finance theory suggests that, in part, business risk can be reduced
through diversification. That is to say an investor can gain some measure of pro
tection from business risk by investing in a number of ventures at varying stages of
development, competing in different industries and/or geographic areas. Investors
should prefer more diversity to less, particularly if they view the risk/reward tradeoff
as unalterable (Gupta & Sapienza 1992). Under such circumstances, there is little,
if any incentive for an investor to be actively involved as such efforts would neither
reduce risk or increase rewards, rather their interests would be better served con
centrating on the selection of investments to include in the portfolio.
Previous research has demonstrated, however, that private investors display a
tendency to specialise rather than diversify in terms of the investments held in their
portfolios which implies that investors do not view the risk/reward tradeoff to be
necessarily fixed.^ Private investors have a strong propensity to invest in earlier
stages of development^ in the US (Wetzel 1981; Tymes & Krasner 1983; Freear &
Wetzel 1988,1990; Aram 1989; Postma & Sullivan 1990; Ehrlich et al. 1994) and
to a lesser extent in the UK (Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991; Mason, Harrison
& Allen 1995) and Sweden (Landstrom 1993). Moreover, private investors in the
US (Wetzel 1981; Tymes & Krasner 1983; Aram 1989) and Canada (Riding & Short
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1987; Riding 1993) demonstrate a clear preference for investing in high technology
manufacturing industries. This might, in fact, be a product of geographical context
as the samples were drawn from fertile areas of innovative activity. Other studies
conducted in the US (Gaston & Bell 1988; Postma & Sullivan 1990), UK (Mason,
Harrison & Chaloner 1991) and Sweden (Landstrom 1993) indicate much wider
investor diversity in terms of industries backed. Informal investment activity is also
highly localised^ in the US (Wetzel 1981; Tymes & Krasner 1983; Aram 1989;
Postma & Sullivan 1990; Freear, Sohl & Wetzel 1994), Canada (Riding & Short
1987, Riding 1993), and the UK (Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991).
Like venture capitalists (Tyebjee & Bruno 1984), informal investors prefer to
invest in markets and/or technologies which are familiar to them or in which they
have had some direct experience (Sullivan 1991; Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991;
Landstrom 1993; Harrison & Mason 1990; Aram 1989). In his studies, Fiet (1991;
1995a; 1995b) provided empirical support for the notion that business risk is con
sidered more important by venture capitalists surveyed than was the case for private
investors (p < .05). In view of their larger deal flow, venture capitalists are weU posi
tioned to assess market risk across a variety of different contexts. Based on their
experience in business and industry, Fiet suggested that private investors may be
comfortable in their abiUties to deal effectively with business risk. He implies that
a linkage may exist between investor characteristics and perceived business risk. It
is important to note that Fiet’s conclusion is couched in relative terms—one can not
conclude that informal investors are not concerned with business risk at all.
Information economics literature often assumes that risk reducing information
can be acquired but at a cost to acquiror. There is an incentive to develop speciali
sation insofar as information acquired for one purpose can be used, in whole or in
part, for other purposes. It seems reasonable to suggest that an investor’s base of
prior experience can be viewed as a highly specialised soxirce of risk reducing
information. What implications does this have for individual investors? The
answer it seems is dependent upon investment style.
When an investor chooses to invest solo or as a “lone w olf(G aston 1989),
opportunity evaluation and post investment monitoring is largely undertaken by
the individual investor although they may consult their network of connections
informally for additional information as required. Being largely self-reliant to
assess business risk, private investors may restrict their opportunity set to areas in
which they have some direct experience, hence:
PI: When an investor chooses to invest alone, they should display a propen
sity to invest in industries in which they have previous experience.
Investing as part of an investment syndicate would appear to offer a number of
advantages to investors: i) the ability to participate in larger investments that could
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not be underwritten alone; ii) benefits arising from bringing together a more
diverse set of investor skills and experience to bear on a venture; iii) the opportu
nity to expand a network of contacts as a source of future investment leads.
Depending on the nature of the experience base of its members, it also seems rea
sonable to suggest that an investment syndicate has a greater capacity to assess
business risk over a wider variety of contexts. One can reasonably expect, how
ever, that opportunities will be restricted to areas in which at least one member of
the syndicate has direct experience, hence;
P2: When an investor chooses to invest with others, they should display a
propensity to invest in industries in which at least one syndicate member
has previous experience.
Managing Agency Risk
Fiet (1991, 1995a, 1995b) reported very strong support for the notion that
informal investors were much more concerned about agency risk—^the extent to
which entrepreneurs and investors hold differing and possibly divergent inter
ests—as opposed to business risk (p < .01). This finding is not altogether surpris
ing given the consistent emphasis informal investors place on the quality of the
entrepreneur/team as a discriminating criteria during the evaluation phase (Haar,
Starr & MacMillan 1988; Harrison & Mason 1992; Stevenson & Coveney 1994;
Riding & Short 1987). How do investors manage agency risk?
A number of authors have suggested that informal investors attempt to manage
agency risk by becoming actively involved with the venture in a number of sup
portive or direct roles^ (Harrison & Mason 1990; Landstrom 1992, 1993). Evi
dence from the US (Wetzel 1981; Tymes & Krasner 1983; Gaston 1989a; Freear,
Sohl & Wetzel 1990), Canada (Venture Economics 1990), UK (Mason, Harrison
& Chaloner 1991; Mason, Harrison & Allen 1995), and Sweden (Landstrom 1993)
indicate that a vast majority, usually 75% or more, of investors can be considered
“active” although a substantial minority prefer to manage their investments in a
“passive” fashion, receiving only periodic financial and operating reports.^ Aside
from active involvement, investors can choose to limit their investments to oppor
tunities presented to them by entrepreneurs which are known to them personally
(Harrison & Mason 1990; Landstrom 1993) or to the referrer of the deal. In either
case, the individual investor or the referrer^ can be a soxirce of agency risk reduc
ing information. Assuming that informal investors prefer to back deals with per
ceived lower levels of agency risk, one would expect that:
P3: When an investor chooses to invest alone, they should display a propen
sity to back entrepreneurs which are either known to them personally or
to the referrer of the deal.
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P4: When an investor chooses to invest with others, they should display a
propensity to back entrepreneurs which are known to them personally, to
other member(s) of the investment syndicate or to the referrer of the deal.
Portfolio Size
Fiet (1991, 1995a, 1995b) concluded that private investors are generally
more concerned with agency as opposed to business risk. In attempting to deal
with agency risk, investors can choose to be actively involved with the venture
in a number of capacities and/or limit their investment activity to opportunities
lead by an individual known to them personally, to other investors in the syndi
cate and/or to referrer of the deal. Previous research has confirmed that the
time commitment required of investors to actively manage their investments is
often quite large. Neiswander (1985) reported that US private investors spend,
on average, five hours per week with each venture in the first six months, and
three and a half hours per week thereafter. A typical UK private investor
spends one or two days a week assisting ventures (3i 1994; Mason, Harrison &
Allen 1995) and Swedish investors surveyed by Landstrom (1993) spend, on
average, twelve hours per month with investee firms. The issue of time commit
ment is particularly acute for ventures in their earliest stages of development,
an interpretation consistent with Stinchcombe’s notion of liabilities of newness
(Stinchcombe 1965). What is the implication of active involvement in terms of
portfolio size? We suggest that the answer to this question is also dependent
upon investment style.
A perceived advantage of investing by way of syndicates is the ability to diver
sify risk over a larger number of investments. It is reasonable to suggest that it is
not necessary for a given investor to be actively involved with all the ventures in
which he has invested, rather a member(s) of the syndicate whose background is
best suited to the task can assume an active role while other members are only pas
sively involved. It follows that time constraints will be particularly acute for inves
tors who forgo the benefits of co-investment and choose to invest primarily on
their own, hence:
P5: The greater the propensity of an investor to invest on their own, the
smaller the number of early stage investments in their portfolio.
in .

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

Serial investors were identified through a combination of: i) leads provided by
The Enterprise Support Group, a Guildford based company which, among other
activities, manages a nationwide computerised investment opportunity database
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service in the UK known as Venture Net; and ii) personal contacts. Each investor
provided us with a detailed chronology of their private investment activity. In
addition to written summaries prepared by respondents, semi-structured inter
views (60-90 minutes duration) were arranged with each investor to gain addi
tional insights.
For each investment made, respondents were asked to provide the following
information:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the date the investment was made;
referral source;
industrial sector;
stage of development;
size of investment;
their personal equity stake;
the composition of the syndicate, if any;
their role in the venture, if any (for example, non-Executive Chairman);
a subjective assessment of performance or exit details if available.

In addition, investors were asked to indicate whether they, or any member of
the syndicate, were familiar with: i) the concept itself; ii) the industry in which the
venture competed; and iii) the entrepreneur prior to the investment being made.
“Familiarity” was measured dichotomously (yes/no) given the difficulties faced in
trying to: i) operationalise these variables in a meaningful and consistent way for
respondents; ii) accurately measure “depth” of familiarity; and iii) maintain the
time commitment required of respondents to a reasonable level.
In all, eight seri^ investors agreed to participate in our study providing back
ground information on forty-one private investments. The profile of a “typical”
serial investor in our sample is as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

a male; who
had founded two ventures; and
made five private investments averaging £65,000 each; to
early stage (45%) and later stage ventures (55%); competing in
a service (55%), manufacturing (25%), or high technology (20%) industry;
and usually
• investing in syndication with others (75%).
In this paper, we focussed our attention exclusively on the early stage invest
ments made by respondents. All but one of the investors had made at least one
investment in early stage ventures which yielded detailed information on 17 early
stage investments.
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rV. FINDINGS
Two distinct groups of serial investors emerged; one group choosing to invest on
their own all the time^ (n = 2 ) while the other almost exclusively invested as part
of investment syndicates^® (n = 5). Compared to the results of earlier studies
(Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991; Mason, Harrison & Allen 1995) which con
cluded that the majority of UK private investors are independent, a majority of the
respondents in our study (70%) invest with others either exclusively or most of the
time. Venture capital funds invested alongside private individuals in two syndi
cated early stage deals we reviewed and followed on at a later date in one other.
Freear, Sohl & Wetzel (1990) were the first to provide evidence in support of the
“complementarity hypothesis” concluding that private investors typically invest in
smaller amounts and at earUer stages than venture capitalists. The relationship
between formal and informal venture capital investors was viewed in sequential
terms. On the basis of our interviews, we would expand the notion of complemen
tarity to include deals where venture capitalists and private investors invest simul
taneously with the latter assuming the role of active and informed monitor based
on prior relevant industry and/or new venture experience.
To test propositions 1 and 2, we asked respondents if they, or one of the co
investors to a deal, had prior experience with the industry in which the venture
competed. When an investor chose to invest alone, only one deal was completed in
an industry in which the investor had some previous direct experience. For deals
which involved a syndicate of investors, over half the investments we reviewed
were made in an industry sector in which at least one member of the syndicate had
direct experience. Clearly, solo serial investors appear to have achieved a high
degree of industrial diversification in their portfolios but perhaps at the expense of
forgoing the possible benefits from specialising their investments in industries in
which they had prior experience. It would appear that syndicate serial investors can
achieve a measure of industrial diversification simply by investing as part of a
group comprised of individuals with diverse backgrounds in industry. On the basis
of these findings, we conclude that proposition 1 is not supported and that propo
sition 2 received modest support.
That is not to say that investors invest “blindly” into opportunities totally unfa
miliar to them. Respondents were asked if they or any member of the syndicate
was familiar with the “concept” upon which an investment proposal was based. In
a majority of cases for both solo (60%) and syndicate (82%) serial investors, at
least one investor reported some degree of famiUarity with the concept. In many
respects, concept familiarity may be a necessary prerequisite to the decision to
invest and reinforces the importance for entrepreneurs seeking funding to commu
nicate their ideas in a clearly understandable and coherent way to potential inves
tors.

Serial Investors and Early Stage Finance

167

We proposed that private investors would choose to deal with agency risk by
displaying a propensity to back an entrepreneur known to them personally, to other
member(s) of the syndicate and/or to the referrer of the deal. For a majority of the
deals backed by solo investors (70%), the entrepreneur was known either by the
investor or the referrer; the comparable figure for syndicated investments, includ
ing situations where the entrepreneur was known personally by a syndicate part
ner, was 55%. In general, our data lends support to propositions 3 and 4 which
argued that private investors attempt to deal with agency risk by backing “known
entities.” On the face of it, serial investors display a much stronger propensity to
invest in “familiar people” as opposed to “famiUar industries”; evidence which
lends some support to Fiet’s (1991,1995a, 1995b) conclusion that informal inves
tors are much more concerned about agency as opposed to market or business risk.
It is also important to note that, almost as often as not, syndicate serial investors
will back entrepreneurs which are personally unknown to them or to other member(s) of the group. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there might be “comfort in
numbers” insofar as individuals contemplating making an investment feel com
fortable with inherent agency risk secure in the knowledge that a number of other
individual investors also have capital at risk in the venture.
In view of the time required for investors to engage in various post-investment
activities, particularly for ventures in their earliest stages of development, we
argued that solo investors who eschew the benefits of information and “monitor”
sharing through participation in syndicates should have a smaller number of early
stage investments in their portfolio. We partitioned the sample into two distinct
subgroups—solo serial investors who exclusively invest on their own and syndi
cate serial investors who exclusively or in large measure invest alongside others—
as follows:
A number of interesting trends can be observed in Table 1. First, solo serial
investors have made fewer private investments in an absolute sense, however, the
proportion of investments made in early stage ventures is higher than is the case for
syndicate serial investors. It would appear that solo serial investors prefer to deal
with a small number of early stage ventures at any one point in time with the aim
of developing the venture to a point that follow-on finance is required. The benefits
Table 1
Early Stage Investment Activity Summary
Calculated Means
Total Number of Private Investments Made
Proportion of Investments: Early Stage
Number of Investments in Portfolio
Number of Early Stage Investments in Portfolio

Solo Serial
Investors (n = 2)

Syndicate Serial
Investors (n = 5)

4.00
63%
3.00
2.00

5.50
50%
4.40
2.60
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of risk sharing as part of a group are apparent as syndicate serial investors have
both a larger number and lower proportion of early stage investments in their port
folio at the present time. We thus conclude that proposition 5 is supported.
V. DISCUSSION
Serial investors, whether they invest on their own or with others, display a very
strong tendency to back concepts which are familiar to them and have invested in
a variety of industrial sectors. Compared to the findings of a number of other stud
ies (Sullivan, 1991; Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991; Landstrom 1993; Harrison
& Mason 1990; Aram 1989) which concluded that informal investors prefer to
invest in markets and/or technologies familiar to them or in which they have direct
experience, the serial investors we interviewed display a great deal of diversity in
their actual investment behaviour. The difference may simply be attributable to the
fact that we explicitly restricted our attention to a small sub-segment of the overall
population. In addition, during the course of interviews, many respondents consid
ered their experience in building businesses to be widely applicable in any number
of industries, thus in some respects, it was not surprising to find that investments
were diversified by industry.
In general, agency risk is, to some extent, managed by bringing some prior per
sonal knowledge of the entrepreneur to bear, investing alongside investors who
know the entrepreneur, and/or having the deal referred to them by an individual
who possesses such knowledge. Syndicate investors are more inclined to back
unknown entrepreneurs as compared to solo investors and do seem to draw some
measure of comfort from knowing that “I am not in this investment alone.” How
ever, it is important to note that all respondents relied on themselves to judge the
capabilities of the entrepreneur. One syndicated investor commented: “No matter
how good the opportunity, unless I can get along with the people, I simply won’t
do the deal!”
VI. THE LINK WITH PERFORMANCE
During the course of interviews, we had the respondents provide us with either: i)
a subjective assessment of venture performance; or ii) details of the exit, if avail
able. For purposes of exposition, it is useful to deal with solo and syndicated
investments separately (see Table 2 ).
The advice to be given for serial investors who choose to invest on their
own in early stage ventures is to back individuals known to them personally.
Specialised industry knowledge does not emerge as a discriminating factor in
our analysis. Given their entrepreneurial background, serial investors appear to

Serial Investors and Early Stage Finance

169

Table 2
Solo Serial Early Stage Investment Summary
Industry
Experience

Stage of
Development

Known
Entrepreneur

Performance Assessment
or Exit Details

X
X
X
X

Early Stage
Early Stage
Early Stage
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up

To referrer only

Trade Sale [partial loss] (1 year)
Total Loss (1 year)
Very Disappointing (1 year)
Meeting Expectations (7 years)
Meeting Expectations (2 years)
Meeting Expectations (2 years)
Good Performance (7 years)

/

X
X

X
X
/
/
/
To referrer only

Table 3
Syndicated Investment Summary
Industry
Experience

Stage of
Development

Known
Entrepreneur

X
X

Early Stage
Early Stage
Early Stage
Early Stage
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up
Start-up

X
X
X
X

y

X
X
✓
/
/

X
X
/

y

X
/
/
/
/
/

Performance Assessment
or Exit Details
Total Loss (3 years)
Disappointing (1 year)
Satisfactory (1 year)
Satisfactory (1 year)
Good (4 years)
Good (1 year)
Very Good (6 years)
Very Good (2 years)
Very Good (2 years)
Outstanding (4 years)
Trade Sale [28% IRR] (6 years)

be able to make a positive contribution to the development of early stage ven
tures irrespective of industry which lends some measure of credence to the
believe that “venture building skills” are widely applicable in any number of
industry settings.
For investors choosing to invest with others, backing known entrepreneurs
appears to be a discriminating factor when the hnkage with investment perfor
mance is made. In both instances where a total loss was realised and when perfor
mance was below expectations, the syndicate neither had previous knowledge of
the industry or the people involved. What is particularly striking is that for every
investment that has performed very well, at least one person in the syndicate knew
the entrepreneur prior to the deal being consummated. Irrespective of whether a
serial investor chooses to invest on their own or with others, the advice appears to
be the same—^back known people (see Table 3).

170

ENTREPRENEURIAL AND SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE

5(2) 1996

VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we examined the actual investment behaviour of an active sub-seg
ment of the informal market for venture capital, serial investors, and have
explored, in a preliminary way, the linkage between individual investor character
istics, investment activity and performance. In view of the small sample size and
the inherent and ever present problem of sampling bias, we are reluctant to draw
firm conclusions, however, a number of patterns appeared based on our analysis of
actual investment behaviour as follows;
• serial investors display a strong propensity to invest in early stage ventures;
• the extent of co-investment activity among this highly active group of
investors is greater than previously thought in the UK;
• investments are made in a variety of industry sectors and in a majority of
instances in industries where the investor and/or syndicate partner has lim
ited direct previous experience;
• famiUarity with the concept appears to be a necessary, but insufficient pre
requisite to the decision to invest;
• agency risk is managed, to some extent, by backing entrepreneurs which
are either known personally to the investor, another syndicate member and/
or to the referrer of the deal;
• when a serial investor chooses to invest with others, they display a greater
propensity to back unknown entrepreneurs, however, when the perfor
mance linkage is made, prior knowledge of the entrepreneur emerges as a
discriminating factor—for both investments where a loss was realised or
performance had fallen short of expectation, investors or syndicate partners
did not have prior personal knowledge of the entrepreneur;
• syndicate serial investors appear to benefit from sharing the risk with other
individuals—^they have completed more deals, particularly in early stage
ventures.

V in. IMPLICATIONS
For investors, it would appear that some measure of diversification by industry can
be achieved by participating in investment syndicates. A number of investors
explicitly mentioned the importance of group composition both in terms of the
blend of skills and experience each member brings to the group and likeminded
expectations, particularly with respect to the timing and manner of exit. In building
their portfolio, private investors need to be concerned not only with the actual
number of investments made but with the pace at which investments are added to
the portfolio. Respondents uniformly reported spending more time with the ven
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ture, the shorter the period of the time the investment was in their portfolio; a
seemingly reasonable response to inherently high levels of agency risk in the
period leading up to and immediately following the consummation of a deal.
For entrepreneurs seeking informal venture capital, our study reinforces the
importance of being able to conmiunicate in clear and unambiguous terms the
nature of the investment opportunity to potential investors. Moreover, it is impor
tant for the entrepreneur to approach the right investor, preferably someone they
know personally. Solo and syndicate serial investors have invested in a variety of
industries, however, if an entrepreneur chooses to approach a solo investor, they
should ensure that the individual has both the financial capacity and the time avail
able to contribute to the venture development process particularly in the critically
important early days. It appears that investment syndicates do have greater capac
ity to take on more deals and can offer a variety of different skills and expertise to
the venture team.
For policy makers, particularly in the UK, which have largely concentrated
their efforts on supporting means for bringing investors and entrepreneurs together
in a timely and efficient manner, some thought should be given to exploring means
of facilitating the formation of syndicates. Investing as part of a syndicate seems to
be a much more widespread phenomenon in the UK than previously thought.
Anecdotal evidence from our interviews confirmed the difficulties investors face
in not only trying to unearth promising investment opportunities but in identifying
suitable partners with whom to share the risk of investing in private, unquoted
early stage ventures.
IX. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In a very real sense, our research has looked at investment activity from a “macro”
perspective. There are a number of interesting “micro” issues which can be
explored when detailed and complete private investment chronologies are pro
vided by investors. How does the pattern of investment activity change when an
investor realises a loss on an investment? A number of investors commented that
they became somewhat more selective in the subsequent investments they made
after a negative event by investing in industrial sectors in which they had direct
experience and, more importantly, by backing people known to them personally or
to their syndicate partners. Similarly, does the pattern of investment activity
change when an investor realises a substantial gain on an investment? To what
extent does a “play money” mentality set in whereby investors are prepared to back
ventures competing in an unfamiliar industry lead by an entrepreneur unknown to
them or to other investors in the deal? Over time, does an investor enhance his abil
ity to identify “winners”?
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A clear need also exists to examine issues related to investment syndication
and co-investment activity. If the most active segment of the population dispropor
tionately invests as a part of a group, it is imperative to understand the dynamics of
syndication. How do syndicates form in the first place? Do groups of investors col
lectively make better decisions than an individual investor can make on their own?
Previous research has highlighted the importance of having a balanced manage
ment team in place—does the same hold true for an investment syndicate? Does a
diversity of perspectives among the investor group lead to a performance advan
tage? How is the relationship between an investor group and the entrepreneur man
aged? As with any emerging field of study, much work needs to be done and many
issues remain largely unresolved.
NOTES
1.

See Gaston (1989); Postma and Sullivan (1990); Stevenson and Coveney (1994); Landstrom
(1992).
2. Landstrom (1995) identified two distinct strategies used by informal investors to aid them in
making investment decisions. Specialist investors choose to limit their activity in areas related
to their particular market and/or technical expertise. Compared to investors which sought port
folio diversification in terms of industry and/or stage of development, specialists examined
fewer proposals and exhibited a higher propensity to invest than explicitly diversified investors.
Having said this, the two groups relied on similar criteria to evaluate investment opportunities.
3. This is not altogether surprising in view of the large number of business angels with prior new
venture experience. It is reasonable to suggest, however, that “venture development skills” are
very general in nature and, in all likelihood, would be useful to any firm regardless of context
(industry, stage of development, geographic area).
4. Investing close to home may be a logical investor response to inherent inefficiencies of the
informal venture capital market. Investors are, in all likelihood, more aware of potential oppor
tunities in their local area reliant as they are upon highly localised referral networks for creating
deal flow. Moreover, research suggests that most business angels are active investors, providing
ongoing “hands on” assistance in a number of capacities to investees. Distance may thus create
a substantial barrier to investor/entrepreneur interaction and hamper the ability of the investor
to effectively monitor his investment.
5. One in twelve investors were classified as “lone wolfs” by Gaston (1989). In general, a small
percentage, usually 10% or less, of US and Swedish business angels invest alone. UK business
angels are decidedly more independent, in excess of 60% of the respondents of two surveys
(Mason, Harrison & Chaloner 1991; Mason, Harrison & AUen 1995) invested alone.
6. Aside from dealing with agency risks, active investor involvement in the venture development
process has been identified as a key non-financial motivation or “hot button” (Wetzel 1981). In
addition, through active involvement, investors have the opportunity to bring their particular
skills, knowledge and experience to bear on the venture, contributions which hopefully posi
tively affect venture performance. In essence, investors perceive that through active involve
ment they can favourably alter the risk/reward payoff for a given investment.
7. Freear, Sohl and Wetzel (1990) raised the possibility that some passive investors may have
invested as part of a syndicate with at least one other co-investor assuming an active role in the
venture on behalf of other participants in the syndicate.
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8.

Haar, Starr and MacMillan (1988) noted that investors were 40% more likely to invest in a ven
ture if a deal was referred to them by a close personal colleague. Referrers have reputational
capital to protect and in some respects they are a preliminary screen for investors.
9. It should be noted, however, that one investor explicitly stated that his primary role was to bring
on additional investors as required. Over time, a syndicate would be formed and this respondent
would be classified as a syndicate serial investor.
10. Two of the investors had each invested on their own once and had each made four additional
investments either in conjunction with others {n = 5) or through joining an existing group of
outside investors {n = 3).
11. This approach is widely used by 3i, the world’s largest venture capital firm. In instances where
a private investor has invested funds alongside 3i, the former invariably assumes an active role
in the venture, usually in the capacity of non-Executive Chairman. As a matter of course, 3i
reserves the right to nominate a board member if circumstances dictate, otherwise they are con
tent maintaining a purely passive role receiving periodic reports only.
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